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JURISDICTIOi\ o , i I i£ UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Court of Appeals entered its decision on July 19, 2007. This Court has 
jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeals' decision 1: ) * rit :>f cei tiorai i in idei I Jtah 
Code *i mi § 78-2-2(3)0 i) i ir I [5 ) 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion, of the Utah Court of Appeals is reported, at 2007 I IT App 249 , 166 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Court of Appeals misconstrued the standards applicable to temporary 
and permanent conditions in premises liability cases. 
correctness. Pratt^Jiejson. 2007 U'l 4 : '• ! *. 164 P.3d 360, 372 (Utah 2007,. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 56 of the t Jtah .Rules of Ci \ i.l„ Pi ocedure is the only Rule relevant to the 
q - ; 
[Summary judgment] shall be rendered if the plead, . , 
depositions, ansv ers to interrogatories, and admissions on file. 
together with the affidavits, if any, *:h,o^ 1\ J there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the mov ing party is entitled to 
a judgment as a nailer of law. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
in the Lower Courts. 
This case arises out of a slip-and-fall accident that occurred at the Hickory Kist 
Deli ("Hickory Kist") on January 26, 2004 (R. at 290). The plaintiff Donna Jex 
commenced a premises liability lawsuit on August 18, 2004 against Hickory Kist and its 
owners, James Fillmore and Angela Fillmore, upon the filing of her Complaint in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah (R. at 4-5). 
On January 10, 2006, Hickory Kist and its owners filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment and supporting memorandum (R. at 146-113). Jex filed a Reply Memorandum 
Opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment for Plaintiff on February 16, 2006 (R. at 241-155). Hickory Kist and 
its owners filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on 
February 24, 2006 (R. at 248-242). They also filed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on March 14, 2006 (R. at 273-265). Jex filed a 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment on March 
29, 2006 (R. at 279-264). The cross-motions for summary judgment came before the trial 
court, the Honorable Judge Derek P. Pullan, and were heard on April 5, 2006 (R. at 291-
282). The trial court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment of Hickory Kist and its 
owners and denied Jex's Motion. Id. The trial court issued a written Ruling on the 
judgment on May 2, 2006. Id A copy of the trial court's ruling is included in the 
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appendix. 
Donna Jex filed a Notice of Appeal on June 16, 2006. The Utah Court of Appeals 
heard the matter and issued a decision on July 19, 2007. The opinion is reported at 2007 
UT App 249, 166 P.3d 655 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). A copy of the opinion is included in 
the appendix. 
Hickory Kist filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court on 
August 14, 2007, and Donna Jex filed a cross-petition on September 13, 2007. The Utah 
Supreme Court granted the petition and cross-petition on December 10, 2007. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
On January 26, 2004, sometime before 8:30 a.m., Donna Jex entered the Hickory 
Kist Deli (R. at 290). She was the first customer of the day. Id. While she was shopping, 
she slipped in a puddle of water on the hardwood floor and fell to the ground, injuring her 
wrist and back (R. at 289). 
There had been new snow earlier that morning (R. at 290). James Fillmore, owner 
of Hickory Kist, came in the back door of the store at about 5:00 a.m. Id. At about 6:30 
a.m. or 7:00 a.m., after removing the snow and spreading ice melt at the front part of the 
store, Mr. Fillmore walked through the front door of the store all the way to the back to 
start cooking. Id. 
At about 5:30 a.m., Sharlene Barber, an employee of Hickory Kist, came into the 
store. IdL Sharlene usually turns the lights on but cannot remember turning them on that 
-3-
day. Id. At about 7:00 a.m. Sharlene put mats on the floor. Id. At some other time that 
morning before any customers had entered the store, a Pepsi delivery man had entered 
and walked to the back of the store (R. at 289). 
Neither James Fillmore nor Sharlene Barber was aware of the puddle of water on 
the store floor before Donna Jex's slip and fall accident (R. at 284). Moreover, Donna 
Jex was not aware of the puddle of water until after she slipped in it (R. at 289). 
Donna Jex filed suit against Hickory Kist and its owners, James Fillmore and 
Angela Fillmore, on August 18, 2004, alleging that Hickory Kist and its owners were 
liable for the hazardous condition that Ms. Jex encountered on the store floor (R. at 5-4). 
Hickory Kist and its owners filed a motion for summary judgment on January 10, 2006, 
arguing inter alia that they were not liable as a matter of law because the puddle of water 
that Ms. Jex slipped in was a temporary condition about which Hickory Kist and its 
owners had no actual or constructive notice (R. at 146-113). 
The trial court, the Honorable Judge Derek P. Pullan, granted Hickory Kist and its 
owners' Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that liability could not lie against a 
storeowner for a temporary unsafe condition unless the storeowner had actual or 
constructive notice (R. at 291-282). The trial court held, inter alia, that since Hickory 
Kist and its owners had no actual or constructive notice of the puddle of water before Jex 
slipped and fell, Hickory Kist and its owners were entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
(R. at 286-284). 
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On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that "neither 
Fillmore nor his employees had actual or constructive knowledge of the puddle of water 
creating the dangerous condition on Hickory Kist's floor." Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2007 UT 
App 249 at f 24, 166 P.3d at 661. However, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court's ruling, holding that Hickory Kist and its owners could be found liable without 
notice of the puddle of water, if it were found that Fillmore or his employees created it. 
Id at ffl|17-18, 166 P.3d at 659-60. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECIDED THAT A 
STOREOWNER COULD BE FOUND LIABLE FOR A TEMPORARY 
UNSAFE CONDITION WITHOUT ANY ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE 
NOTICE. 
The Court of Appeals misconstrued Utah law when it held that a storeowner may 
be liable for a temporary condition that he or his employees create but for which he has 
no actual or constructive notice. 
In Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that "the owner of a business is not a guarantor that his business 
invitees will not slip and fall. He is charged with the duty to use reasonable care to 
maintain the floor of his establishment in a reasonably safe condition for his patrons." 
citing Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 263, 436 P.2d 1021, 1023 (1968); Martin v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc. 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). In the present matter, the Utah 
Court of Appeals found that there was no evidence that Hickory Kist's owner and 
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employees exercised anything less than reasonable care in the maintenance of the floors. 
Jex, 2007 UT App 249 at ffi[ 16, 24, 166 P.3d at 659 and 661. Nevertheless, the court 
held that Hickory Kist could be found liable even without a finding that they knew or 
even should have known of water on the floor of their store. Id. at 117-18, 166 P.3d at 
659-60. Such a ruling is erroneous under Utah law. 
In the context of a storeowner's liability in slip-and-fall cases, the Utah Supreme 
Court has identified two classes of negligence cases: 
The first [class] involves some unsafe condition of a 
temporary nature, such as a slippery substance on the floor 
and usually where it is not known how it got there. In this 
class of cases it is quite universally held that fault cannot be 
imputed to the defendant so that liability results therefrom 
unless two conditions are met: (A) that he had knowledge of 
the condition, that is, either actual knowledge, or constructive 
knowledge because the condition had existed long enough 
that he should have discovered it; and (B) that after such 
knowledge, sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of 
reasonable care he should have remedied it. 
Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478 (citing Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 
176 (Utah 1975)). The court continued: 
The second class of cases involves some unsafe condition of a 
permanent nature, such as: in the structure of the building, or 
of a stairway, etc. or in equipment or machinery, or in the 
manner of use, which was created or chosen by the defendant 
(or his agents), or for which he is responsible. In such 
circumstances, where the defendant either created the 
condition, or is responsible for it, he is deemed to know of the 
condition; and no further proof of notice is necessary. 
Id (citing Allen, 538 P.2d at 176). 
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The distinction between the two types of cases is whether the condition is 
temporary or permanent. In temporary condition cases, the plaintiff must establish notice. 
In permanent condition cases, "where the defendant either created the condition, or is 
responsible for it," notice is presumed. 
In the present matter, the Utah Court of Appeals held that: 
[TJhere is no direct evidence suggesting that the puddle of 
water had been there for any significant period of time. 
Further, there was nothing about the puddle itself suggesting 
that it had been there for a long time. Nor is there any 
reasonable inference that the store owner should have been 
aware of a four-inch puddle of water on the hardwood floor. 
Therefore, we conclude that conjecture and speculation is the 
only way to determine the length of time the puddle was on 
the floor, and thus, it would be improper to impute 
constructive knowledge to Defendants. 
Jex, 2007 UT App. 249 at f 16, 166 P.3d at 659. Nevertheless, the court found that 
liability could be found under the first (temporary condition) category of cases. Id., at f<f 
17-18, 166 P.3d at 659-60. However, the Schnuphase court held that "[u]nder this first 
theory, 'the liability of the owner of a store should be established only when the condition 
complained of has existed for a long enough time that the owner should have known 
about it and corrected it, or has had actual knowledge of the condition complained of.'" 
Id at 478, citing Martin, 565 P.2d at 1140. 
The court provided a rationale for requiring a finding of notice in Goebel v. Salt 
Lake City Southern Railroad Co., 104 P.3d 1185, 1195 (Utah 2004). In Goebel the court 
reasoned that "outside of a few conceivable but highly improbable circumstances, a party 
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will always have notice of its own actions." Id, Nevertheless, the court stated, "we 
believe that failure to repair a defective condition about which one neither knows nor 
reasonably should know is neither negligent nor unreasonable. That is why notice is a 
requirement in negligence cases such as this one." Id Thus, if there is no notice of a 
temporary dangerous condition, there can be no liability. Id.; Allen, 538 P.2d at 176; 
Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478. 
As support for its holding in the present matter, the Utah Court of Appeals cited 
Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), in holding 
that "[ajlthough it is well settled that a store owner must have notice of a dangerous 
condition, 'the variant of this rule . . . is that if the condition . . . was created by the 
defendant himself or his agents or employees, the notice requirement does not apply.'" 
Jex, 2007 UT App. 249 f 17, 166 P.3d at 659, quoting Silcox, 814 P.2d at 624. The quote 
from Silcox was taken from Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360, 361 (Utah 
1973), which states in full: 
[I]n order to impose liability for an injury resulting from some 
foreign substance or defective condition it must have existed 
for such time and manner that in due care the defendant either 
knew or should have known, and remedied it; and the variant 
thereof, that if the condition or defect was created by the 
defendant himself or his agents or employees, the notice 
requirement does not apply. 
Id. The foregoing statement of the law is, of course, correct. It accurately recounts the 
first and second categories of liability, for temporary and permanent conditions, as was 
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explained in Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478. It does not, however, describe two variants of 
the first type of liability, dealing with temporary conditions. Accordingly, the Utah Court 
of Appeals misapplied Utah law when it construed the foregoing to find that no notice is 
required when an owner or employee may have created a temporary unsafe condition. 
The Silcox case is distinguishable from the present matter. In that case, a stock 
cart filled with bags of melting ice was left in a shopping area. Silcox, 814 P.2d at 623. 
Water from the melted ice spread down an aisle, and a patron slipped and fell in the 
resulting puddle. Id The Silcox court held that "[a]n inference could readily be drawn 
by the jury that the water in which plaintiff fell came from the bags of ice on the cart left 
in the aisle by a store employee." Id. at 624-25. Notice in that case was not critical to the 
analysis because, as explained in Goebel 104P.3datll95, "outside of a few conceivable 
but highly improbable circumstances, a party will always have notice of its own actions." 
Certainly, whoever left the stock cart of ice in the shopping aisle in Silcox knew that he or 
she had done so. In contrast, in Jex, the Utah Court of Appeals specifically found that the 
Hickory Kist employees had no actual or constructive notice of the puddle of water in 
which Donna Jex slipped and fell. Jex, 2007 UT App. 249 at ^ 16 and 24, 166 P.3d at 
659 and 661. Of course, with no notice of the puddle, the Hickory Kist employees had no 
way of remedying the unsafe condition. Accordingly, the Utah Court of Appeals erred 
when it held that Hickory Kist could nevertheless be held liable for that condition. Id at 
HI 17 and 18. 
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A similarly distinguishable case is Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 
113, 388 P.2d 409 (1964). In Campbell the plaintiff tripped over a small empty 
cardboard box that had been left in a grocery store aisle, causing her to fall and suffer 
injuries. Id. at 114, 388 P.2d at 410. The court found that a jury could reasonably 
conclude that it was more likely than not a store employee that negligently left the empty 
box in the aisle. Id. at 115-16, 388 P.2d at 410-11. Accordingly, the court found it 
unnecessary to determine whether the store checker at the end of the aisle had adequate 
time to discover the box and remove it. Id. Just as in Silcox, supra, notice was not at 
issue in Campbell because surely the store employee who had left the box in the aisle was 
aware when he or she had done so. 
In Koerv.Mavfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 343, 431 P.2d 566, 569 (1967), the 
court held that: 
In cases such as the present one which involve a loose object 
causing one to fall, it is important to distinguish between the 
situation where the object causing the injury was placed on the 
floor by the employer-store or its employee, or placed there by 
some third person. If it is established that the object causing 
the injury was placed there by the former, or that they were 
aware of its presence, a prima facie case for the jury is 
established on the issue of negligence. 
Id. The Koer case involved a grape on the floor of a grocery store which caused the 
plaintiff to slip and fall. Id at 341, 431 P.2d at 567. However, there was no evidence to 
suggest that the grape was put there by a store employee. Id at 343, 431 P.2d at 569. 
Accordingly, the Koer case does not discuss whether a storeowner may be found liable 
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for a loose object on the ground that an employee may have deposited but where there is a 
specific finding that neither the storeowner nor its employee had any actual or 
constructive knowledge of its existence. Hickory Kist has not found any cases that 
discuss such a scenario. Nevertheless, given the Utah Supreme Court's more recent 
discussions of notice in premises liability cases such as Schnuphase and Goebel, supra, a 
more fair and consistent ruling should be that a storeowner and its employees should be 
found liable if it is shown that they had actual or constructive knowledge of the temporary 
unsafe condition. If, as in Silcox and Campbell, supra, actual or constructive notice of the 
condition can be inferred from the facts of the case, liability should be found. However, 
where there is no actual or constructive knowledge of the condition, there should be no 
liability. 
In the present matter, the court of appeals found that "there is no direct evidence 
indicating who actually caused the water puddle."1 Jex, 2007 UT App 249 at 118, 166 
P.3d at 660. Moreover, the court found that "there is no direct evidence suggesting that 
the puddle of water had been there for any significant period of time. Further, there was 
nothing about the puddle itself suggesting that it had been there for a long time." Id. at ^ 
16, 166 P.3d at 659. Given those findings, the holding in Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478, 
1
 Even though the court of appeals ultimately held that a jury could reasonably infer that 
the puddle was created by Hickory Kist's owner or employee, it observed that "the 
evidence suggests that the source of the water puddle could have been Fillmore, Barber, 
the Pepsi salesman, or even Jex herself." Id Moreover, it should be acknowledged that 
the source of the water puddle may even have been some other source that has not yet 
been considered. 
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should control, that where it is not known how a temporary, unsafe condition got there, a 
storeowner should not be found liable unless he had actual or constructive knowledge of 
the condition. To hold otherwise would be fundamentally unfair and contrary to Utah 
law. See Goebel, 104 P.3d at 1195 ("failure to repair a defective condition about which 
one neither knows nor reasonably should know is neither negligent nor unreasonable"). 
CONCLUSION 
In the present matter, the Utah Court of Appeals erred when it held that Hickory 
Kist could be found liable for a temporary unsafe condition about which it neither knew 
nor reasonably should have known. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court should reverse 
the Court of Appeals' decision and affirm the trial court's ruling that Hickory Kist is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
DATED this 7,2-day of January, 2008. 
STRONG & HANNI 
- ^ ^ ^ - ^ 
Robert L. Janicki 
Michael L. Ford 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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Appendix A 
JUL 2 0 2007 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Donna Jex, 
Plaint i f f and Appellant, 
v. 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUL 1 9 2007 
JRA, Inc., dba Hickory Kist 
Deli; James Fillmore; and 
Angela Fillmore, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20060571-CA 
F I L E D ( J u l y 19 , 2007) 
2007 UT App 249~] 
Fourth District, American Fork Department, 050100121 
The Honorable Derek P. Pullan 
Attorneys: Denton ML Hatch, Spanish Fork, for Appellant 
Robert L. Janicki and Michael L. Ford, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Thorne. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Hi Plaintiff Donna Jex appeals the trial court's order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Defendants JRA, Inc, clba Hickory 
Kist Deli, James Fillmore, and Angela Fillmore. We affirm in 
part and reverse and remand in part. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 On the morning of January 26, 2004, new snow had just 
fallen. James Fillmore, owner of Hickory Kist Deli (Hickory 
Kist), arrived at Hickory Kist for work at approximately 5:00 
a.m. He entered the store through the back door. At about 5:30 
a.m., Sharlene Barber, an employee at Hickory Kist, also arrived 
at the store for work. Generally, Barber turns on the store 
lights when she first arrives at the store, but Baarber cannot 
remember whether she turned the lights on that morning. 
i|3 At approximately 6:30 or 7:00 a.m., Fillmore finished 
removing snow from outside the front of the store and spreading 
ice melt over the front walkways. He then walked through the 
front door and proceeded to the back of the store to begin 
cooking. Around 7:00 a.m., Barber placed mats on the floor at 
the front of the store. Once the mats were down, a person could 
walk on the mats from the front door of the store to the cash 
register located approximately twenty-five feet away. However, 
upon reaching the cash register, a person would have to step off 
the mats and onto the hardwood floor to proceed to the back of 
the store. 
14 Jex came into Hickory Kist sometime before 8:30 a.m. She 
was the first customer of the day. However, sometime before Jex' 
entered the store, a Pepsi salesman had entered and walked to the 
back of the store. When Jex entered the store, she noticed that 
the lights in the store were dim, as if some lights had not yet 
been turned on. Jex reached the area in the store where the cash 
register is located and then turned right to go to the back of 
the store. She intended to place an order and noticed that 
nobody was at the counter. As she turned, she slipped on the 
hardwood floor due to a puddle of water approximately four inches 
in diameter. 
f5 Although Fillmore did not inspect the floor prior to the 
accident that morning, he speculated that the water either came 
from his shoes or Jex's shoes. Jex was wearing boots with new, 
but small, tread. Fillmore and Barber were both wearing shoes 
with deep tread. 
1[6 Fillmore knew that for persons wearing hard rubber shoes, 
the hardwood floor was slippery when wet. Typically, Fillmore 
decides where to place the mats in his store, and although he had 
placed a mat in the area where the accident occurred on other 
occasions, he did not place a mat there at the time of the 
accident because the one he intended to use had a turaed-up edge. 
Moreover, Fillmore acknowledged that keeping floors clean and 
water free is important; therefore, he instructs employees to 
stop what they are doing and take care of the floor if there is 
something on the floor. In maintaining the store's cleanliness 
throughout the day, Hickory Kist employees are required to 
perform various tasks such as wiping down the tables and ensuring 
that everything is in proper order for customers. The employees' 
daytime tasks do not, however, include periodically mopping the 
store floors. Instead, this task is performed at night after the 
store is closed. 
^7 Jex broke her wrist and injured her back when she fell in 
Hickory Kist. She filed this lawsuit to recover for her 
injuries. Jex and Defendants filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment. The trial court granted Defendants1 summary judgment 
20060571-CA 2 
motion and denied Jex's summary judgment motion. Jetx now 
appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
t8 Jex argues that the trial court erred when it granted 
summary judgment in favor of Defendants, Specifically, Jex 
asserts that the trial court erred in holding that she could not 
recover under either of the two negligence theories she asserted 
against Defendants for the injuries she received from her slip-
and-fall accident in Hickory Kist. Jex also argues that summary 
judgment in this case is improper because issues of material fact 
exist* "Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "On 
appeal, we review the district court's ruling on summary judgment 
for correctness." Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18,^6, 70 P.3d 78. 
ANALYSIS 
^9 In Utah, a business owner is not required to ensure that his 
business invitees will not slip and fall. See Martin v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc.. 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977) ("[P]roperty owners 
are not insurers of the safety of those who come upon their 
property, even though they are business invitees."); Preston v. 
Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021, 1023 (1968). Instead, a 
business owner "is charged with the duty to use reasonable care 
to maintain the floor of his establishment in a reasonably safe 
condition for his patrons." S'chnuphase v. Storehouse Mkts.. 918 
P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996) (quotations and citation omitted). 
110 In considering a store owner's duty of reasonable care in 
slip-and-fall cases, we note that "slip-and-fall cases have 
usually been regarded as falling into . . . two different classes 
[of negligence]," Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. 538 P.2d 175, 
176 (Utah 1975). The first class of cases "involves some unsafe 
condition of a temporary nature, such as a slippery substance on 
the floor T,] and usually . , , it is not known how it got there." 
Id. The "second class . , , involves some unsafe condition of a 
permanent nature, such as[J in the structure of the building, or 
of a stairway, etc. or in equipment . . . or its manner of use, 
which was created or chosen by the defendant (or his agents), or 
for which he is responsible." Id- Jex argues that she can 
recover under either the temporary condition or the permanent 
condition theory of liability. 
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I. Temporary Condition 
i[ll Jex contends that the trial court erred in determining that 
she could not recover under the temporary condition theory. 
Under the temporary condition theory, a plaintiff can only 
recover if the defendant has notice of the dangerous condition. 
Specifically, the following two conditions must be satisfied: 
(1) "that [the defendant] had knowledge of the condition, that 
is, either actual knowledge[] or constructive knowledge because 
the condition had existed long enough that he should have 
discovered it; and [(2)3 that after such knowledge, sufficient 
time elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should 
have remedied it." Id, "The variant of this rule, however, is 
'that if the condition . . . was created by the defendant himself 
or his agents or employees, the notice requirement does not 
apply.™ Silcox v, Skaaas Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Loner v. Smith Food King Store, 531 
P.2d 360, 361 (Dtah 1973)). Therefore, "it is important to 
distinguish between the situation where the [condition] causing 
the injury was [created] . , . by the employer-store or its 
employee, or [was created] by some third person.M Koer v. 
Mayfair Mkts.. 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566, 569 (1967). 
A. Temporary Condition Created by a Third Person 
Hl2 First, regarding whether Fillmore or his employees had 
notice of a dangerous condition created by a third party,1 it is 
undisputed that neither Fillmore nor his employees had actual 
knowledge that there was water on the store's hardwood floors. 
Instead, Jex asserts that they had constructive notice because 
the water was on the floor long enough that the owner or 
employees should have discovered it. See Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 
478. 
1. We address Jex's legal argument that Fillmore or Barber had 
notice of the puddle of water on the floor based solely on the 
fact that a Pepsi salesman entered the store prior to Jex 
entering the store. Otherwise, our analysis would be 
unnecessary. The notice requirement is only at issue if the 
puddle of water was created by some third person. Since Jex was 
Hickory Kist's first customer of the day, the only persons who 
could have created the puddle of water were Jex, Fillmore, 
Barber, or the Pepsi salesman. Without the Pepsi salesman's 
entrance into Hickory Kist, there would be no other third person 
that could have caused the puddle of water on the floor. 
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1l3 Although Utah case law does not lay out precise factors for 
determining whether a store owner2 had constructive notice of a 
dangerous condition, it does establish that constructive notice 
is imputed when "the condition had existed long enough that [the 
store owner] should have discovered it." Id, "Thus, the 
importance of the time factor to the issue of constructive notice 
is clear." R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Liability of Proprietor of 
Store> Office, or Similar Business Premises for Injury from Fall 
on Floor Made Slippery by Tracked-in or Spilled Water, Oil, Mud, 
Snow, and the Like, 62 A>L.R-2d 6, § 7b (1958). To establish 
that a temporary condition existed long enough to give a store 
owner constructive notice of it, a plaintiff must present 
evidence that "would show from the condition of the debris on the 
floor that it had been there for an[] appreciable time." Ohlson 
v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 568 P.2d 753, 754 {Utah 1977). 
Constructive notice cannot be grounded on speculation or mere 
allegation. See Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co,. 3 Utah 2d 364, 284 
P.2d 477, 478 (1955) ("[A] jury cannot be permitted to speculate 
that the defendant was negligent,"); cf. Koer, 431 P.2d at 570 
("[A] mere fall does not prima facie establish a jury 
question."). 
1114 In determining whether a store owner had constructive notice 
of a dangerous condition, we look to various Utah slip-and-fall 
cases. In Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Utah 2d 364, 284 P.2d 
477, 478 (1955), the plaintiff slipped and fell on a small 
quantity of water on the floor in the defendant's coffee shop. 
See id. at 478. The water "somehow got on the floor some time 
after [the plaintiff] was seated." Id. The court found that the 
plaintiff could not recover because "there was no evidence as to 
how the water got onto the floor, by whom it was deposited, 
exactly when it arrived there or that the defendant had knowledge 
of its presence," Id. Similarly, in Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 
Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967), the court determined that a 
plaintiff could not recover after she slipped and fell on a grape 
found on the floor of a grocery store. See id. at 569-70. The 
court reasoned that from the evidence, it was unable "to find any 
support for the further and necessary inference that th[e 
dangerous] condition was caused by an act of the defendant,* or 
that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of it." 
Id. at 569. And in Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 
P.2d 175 (Utah 1975), the court found that a plaintiff could not 
recover from injuries he sustained after he slipped and fell on 
some cottage cheese on a store floor. See id. at 177. The court 
noted that there was "no evidence, nor any basis from which a 
2. For the sake of convenience, our analysis regarding a store 
owner also encompasses a store owner's employees and agents. 
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fair inference could be drawn, that the defendant had knowledge 
of the cottage cheese on the floor," Id. 
<fl5 In contrast, in Qhlson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P. 2d 753 
{Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court determined that it was 
reasonable for a jury to find that a store owner had constructive 
notice of a dangerous condition in the store. See id. at 754-55. 
In that case, the plaintiff slipped and fell on some dry 
spaghetti on a grocery store floor. See id. at 754. According 
to the evidence presented at trial, "the spaghetti was dirty, 
crushed, broken into small pieces, and . . . extended from aisle 
ten around the end of that aisle into the main aisle for five or 
six feet toward the cash register at the front of the store.11 
Id. The evidence also indicated that "a casual glance down the' 
aisle" forty-five minutes before the accident was the only 
inspection of the store floor during the store's busiest time of 
day. Id. at 755. Moreover, the aisle in which the spaghetti was 
strewn was visible from the cash register. See id. Affirming 
the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the supreme court 
concluded that the evidence supported a jury finding that the 
dangerous condition had existed for some time, and that the store 
owner had constructive notice of the condition. See id. 
H16 In this case, there is no direct evidence suggesting that 
the puddle of water had been there for any significant period of 
time. Further, there was nothing about the puddle itself 
suggesting that it had been there for a long time. Nor is there 
any reasonable inference that the store owner should have been 
aware of a four-inch puddle of water on the hardwood floor. 
Therefore, we conclude that conjecture and speculation is the 
only way to determine the length of time the puddle was on the 
floor, and thus, it would be improper to impute constructive 
notice to Defendants. 
B. Temporary Condition Created by Hickory Kistrs Owner 
or Employee 
fl7 Second, Jex argues that even if Defendants did not have 
constructive notice of the dangerous condition, she can still 
recover under the temporary condition theory because either 
Fillmore or Barber themselves created the condition. Although it 
is well settled that a store owner must have notice of a 
dangerous condition, "[t]he variant of this rule . . . is that if 
the condition . . . was created by the defendant himself or his 
agents or employees, the notice requirement does not apply." 
Silcox v. Skagcrs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (quotations and citation omitted).. In Silcox v. 
Skaacrs Alpha Beta, Inc», 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), the 
plaintiff slipped and fell on some water that came from melting 
bags of ice stacked on a stocking cart. See id. at 624. The 
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court found that a reasonable inference could be draiwn that a 
cart for stacking groceries was left by a store employee, 
creating a foreseeable risk of harm. See id, at 624-25. 
Hl8 Again, in this case, there is no direct evidence indicating 
who actually caused the water puddle. Still, in Silcox we 
determined that " [i]t is for the jury to decide, even if only as 
a matter of inference, whether one of [a3 defendant [*s) employees 
created the risk of harm." Id, at 625 {emphasis added). In this 
case, the evidence suggests that the source of the water puddle 
could have been Fillmore, Barber, the Pepsi salesman, or even Jex 
herself. However, we note that while Jex was wearing boots with 
small tread, both Fillmore and Barber were wearing shoes with 
deep tread. Moreover, we note that Jex was the first customer of 
the day and slipped shortly after she entered Hickory Kist. 
Based on this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that the 
puddle of water on the floor was caused by Fillmore or one of his 
employees, and thus, we reverse and remand as to the issue of 
whether Hickory Kist's owner or employee created the puddle of 
water. 
II. Permanent Condition 
1|l9 Next, Jex asserts that she could recover under the permanent 
condition theory of liability because Hickory Kist used a wood 
floor that it knew was slippery when it became wet cind because 
Fillmore failed to direct his store employees to use mats in 
areas of high customer traffic. Under this theory of liability, 
the dangerous condition must be both inherently dangerous and 
foreseeable. See Schnuphase v. Storehouse Mkts., 9l8 P.2d 476, 
477 (Utah 1996). 
120 In Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992), the plaintiff slipped on a piece of lettuce in a 
grocery store. See id. at 1225. The store displayed its lettuce 
as a "farmer's pack," meaning that the lettuce did not have its 
wilted leaves removed. Id. The store placed empty boxes on the 
floor where customers could place the discarded lettuce leaves. 
See id. This court determined that w [i]t was reasonably 
foreseeable that some leaves would fall or be dropped on the 
floor by customers thereby creating a dangerous condition." Id, 
at 1227. 
^21 This same theory--that a store owner is liable for injuries 
caused by a foreseeable, inheirently dangerous condition in the 
store--was addressed in Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 
P.2d 476, 478 {Utah 1996). However, in Schnuphase, the Utah 
Supreme Court limited the Canfield holding, noting that 
"[cjentral to [the court's] finding in Canfield was the 
determination that [the store] had notice of the potentially 
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hazardous condition, as evidenced by the storeTs placement of 
empty boxes and its instituting a regular schedule for inspecting 
and cleaning the produce section" of the store. Id. at 479, It 
emphasized that "inherent danger and foreseeability remain 
essential elements of the claim," id., and suggested some concern 
about extending a store owner's liability in method of operation 
cases, see id.; Babbitt v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp., 2000 UT App SOU 
(mem.) (indicating that the Schnuphase court "expressed concern 
with extending store owner liability in method of operation 
cases")• 
[^22 In Schnuphase, the plaintiff was injured when she slipped 
and fell on some ice cream that was on the floor in the deli 
section of the defendant's store. See id, at 477. The plaintiff 
claimed that the defendant failed to take the proper 
precautionary measures to ensure the store floor remained clear 
and safe for store customers. See id. at 479. The court 
concluded that the "plaintiff failed to present sufficient 
evidence on a claim of negligent mode of operation and that 
reasonable minds could not differ on the question of whether [the 
store owner] took reasonable precautions to protect its 
customers." Id. 
K23 In this case, given the limiting effect of Schnuphase and 
the lack of direct evidence indicating that Defendants chose a 
method of operation that was inherently dangerous and 
foreseeable, we conclude that Defendants were not negligent. 
Unlike the defendant in Canfield, Defendants did not have notice 
that they created a potentially hazardous condition.3 
CONCLUSION 
K24 Under the temporary condition theory of negligence, we 
affirm the trial court's holding that neither Fillmore nor his 
employees had actual or constructive knowledge of the puddle of 
water creating the dangerous condition on Hickory Kist's floor. 
However, we reverse and remand as to whether Fillmore or his 
employees created the puddle of water. As to the permanent 
condition theory'of negligence, we affirm the trial court's 
ruling that there is no evidence suggesting that Fillmore "chose 
a method of operation that created an inherently dangerous 
3. Based on our prior discussion, we do not find issues of 
material fact that preclude summary judgment, except as to 
whether the Hickory Kist store owner or employee created the 
puddle of water. 
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condition, and that the inherently dangerous condition was 
foreseeable." 
JudZth M. Billings, Judge v 
!5 WE CONCUR: 
Gre goryltT"" 6rme, Judge 
William A. Thome, Judge 
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This matter comes before the Court on the parties* Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. On 
April 5,2006, the Court heard oral argument The Plaintiff Donna Jex was represented by Mr. Denton 
M. Hatch. The Defendants JRA, INC, dba Hickory Kist Deli, James Fillmore, and Angela Fillmore 
("Defendants" or "Hickory Kist5') were represented by Mr. Michael L. Ford. 
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After carefully considering the arguments and the law presented, the Court enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On the morning of January 26,2004, there was new snow on the ground. James Fillmore, owner 
of Hickory Kist, arrived at work around 5:00 am. and entered through the backidoor After 
removing snow and spreading ice melt in front of the store, he walked in the front door and 
walked to the back of the store to begin cooking. This occurred around 6:30 or;7:00 a,m. 
An employee of Hickory Kist, Sharlene Barber, entered the store around 5:30 a:m. Around 7:00 
a.m. she placed mats on the floor 
As part, of her daily routine in opening the store, Barber turns on the lights, but cannot 
specifically remember turning on the lights that morning. 
Barber believes that only she and Fillmore were in the area where the accident occurred before 
the Plaintiff. 
Barber stated that there is never water on the floor in the mornings. She did not inspect for water 
and never has inspected for water in the morning. Because of her cooking and other 
responsibilities, it is unlikely she would have noticed water on the floor by chance. 
Barber was working behind the front counter at the time of the accident. The place where the 
accident occurred is about 8 feet in front of the counter. Standing behind the counter, one can 
see the place where the accident occurred. 
Plaintiff Donna Jex came into the store prior to 8:30 a.m. and was the first customer-that day. 
When Jex entered the store, the lights were dim as if some had not been turned on, 
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8. Before Jex entered that morning, a Pepsi salesman had come in and walked to tlie back of the 
store. 
9. When a/person comes into the front door of the store, he or she walks across about 25ifeet of 
mats before he or she arrives at the cash register, With the cash register on the left, the person 
can step off the mats to go to the back of the store on the hardwood floor. 
10. When Jex reached the area of the cash register, she turned to the right to go to the back of the 
store. She intended to make a large order and saw no one at the front counter. As she turned, 
she slipped on the floor. 
11. As she was falling, Jex saw a puddle of water about 4 inches in diameter on the floor which 
caused her to fall. 
12. While Fillmore did not inspect the floor prior to the accident that morning, he speculated that the 
water either came from his shoes or Jex's shoes. After the accident he inspected the area and 
found a small amount of water on Jex's boots and on the floor. He opined that there
 rwas a 90% 
chance*the water came from Jex's shoes. 
13. Jex was wearing boots with new, but small, tread. 
14. Fillmore was wearing Asics or Adidas athletic shoes. Barber was wearing Skechers J>rand shoes 
with thick soles. 
15. The owners of the store knew that for persons wearing hard rubber shoes, the hardwood floor 
was slippery when wet. 
'16, There were no warning signs that the floor is slippery when wet 
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17. There were no mats in the aisle areas. Fillmore decides where to place the matsi He Had 
previously placed a mat in the area where the accident occurred, but a mat was not there at the 
time of the accident. 
\ 8. Employees were not given formal instruction or training on inspecting the floors. However, 
keeping floors clean and water free is an important issue. Employees are instructed that if there 
is something on the floor, to drop what they are doing and take care of the floor. Employees 
wipe the tables throughout the day and ensure that everything is in proper ordeii for customers. 
19. The store floors are cleaned at night after the store is closed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A party is entitled to summary judgment when there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court is to view all the 
facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Bowen v. Riverton Citv, 656 P.2d 434,436 (Utah 1982). In opposing a motion for 
summary judgment, the plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of proving the elements of his or her cause 
of action. "When a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an element essential to the party's 
casc.there can be no genuine issue of material fact since a complete failure of proof concerning an 
essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial" Celotex 
Comv.Catrett 477 U.S. 317,321 (1986). 
A store owner "is not a guarantor that his business invitees will not slip and fall.** Merino v. 
Albertsons. Inc.. 975 P.2d 467,468 (Utah 1999); Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets^ 918 R2d 476> 478 
(Utah 1996) fquoting Preston v. Lamb. 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1968). Accordingly, 
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the Utah Supreme Court has "recognized only two legal theories under which a plaintiff may recover 
against a business owner for injuries arising from a slip-and-fall accident" Id. 
The first theory involves unsafe conditions of a temporary nature. The store owner must have 
either actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe condition: 
The first [class] involves some unsafe condition of a temporary nature, such as a slippery 
substance on the floor and usually where it is not known how it got there. In this class of cases it 
is quite universally held that fault cannot be imputed to the defendant so that liability results 
therefrom unless two conditions are met: (A) that he had knowledge of the condition,'that is, 
either actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the condition had existed long 
enough that he should have discovered it; and (B) that after such knowledge, sufficient time 
elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied it. 
Schuohase. 918 P.2d at 478 (quoting Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. Inc., 538 P.2d 175,176 (Utah 
1975) The second theory involves unsafe conditions of a permanent nature and is based on the store 
owner creating the hazardous condition: 
The second class of cases involves some unsafe condition of a permanent nature, such as: in the 
structure of the building, or of a stairway, etc. or in equipment or machinery, or in the manner of 
use, which was created or chosen by the defendant (or his agents), or for which he isjresponsible. 
In such circumstances, where the defendant either created the condition, or is responsible for it, 
he is deemed to know of the condition; and no further proof of notice is necessary. 
Schuphase. 918 P.2d at 478 (quoting Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. Inc., 538 P.2d 175,176 (Utah 
2975). 
Where a store owner's method of operation creates an unsafe condition, the condition must have 
been foreseeable and inherently dangerous. Schnunhase. 918 P.2d at 479; see also, Long v! Smith Food 
King Store. 531 P.2d 360,362 (Utah 1973) (essential element in method of operation claim's is that 
condition created by defendant is of such character that defendant has or should have! notice of inherently 
dangerous condition). For purposes of analysis, method of operation claims are treated as being a 
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permanent condition. Id 
DECISION 
Temporary Condition 
Case law is clear that where an unsafe condition is temporary, the store owner must have had 
actual or constructive knowledge of the condition, and had time to remedy it, A review of the case law 
applying the temporary condition theory is instructive 
In Lindsay v Eccles Hotel Company, 282 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955), the plaintiff slipped'in a small 
quantity of water on the floor of a coffee shop. Evidence indicated that a waitress had'delivered water to 
plaintiff and her companion. However, the court found there was no evidence whether the waitress, the 
plaintiff, her companion, or other patrons spilled water, when it was spilled, or whether management 
knew of its existence. The court ruled that "[ujnder such circumstances, a jury cannot be permitted to 
speculate that the defendant was negligent" 
In Koerv Mavfair Markets. 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967), the plaintiff slipped on a grape in 
defendant's store. There was no evidence to show the store knew or should have known of any 
hazardous condition, or that it had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition. 
In Long v Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360 (Utah 1973), the store was giving away small 
samples of pumpkin pie topped with whipped cream. Plaintiff slipped on one of the pieces 'of pumpkin 
pie. There was no evidence that a store employee or anyone else saw pie on floor prior to afccident 
Plaintiff argued that the manner in which the samples were distributed was inherently dangerous because 
of the likelihood that the slippery substance would be dropped on the floor. The court found that the 
defendant did not have notice that the foreign substance was on the floor for sufficient time that in due 
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care it should have been removed. The court rejected plaintiffs argument that giving away samples of 
pie was inherently dangerous. 
In Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. Inc., 538 P.2d 175 (Utah 1975), the plaintiff slipped on 
cottage cheese that was being given out as a sample. Neither the plaintiff, his wife, nor any of the store 
personnel saw pottage cheese on the floor prior to the accident. The only way to determine how it got 
there and for how long it had been on the floor was by inference and conjecture. Id. at: 175. The plaintiff 
argued that the method by which the store handed out the cottage cheese made it foreseeable;that 
customers would spill it on the floor. The court summarily ruled that there was "no showing of any 
dangerous condition of a permanent nature." Id. at 177. 
In Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets^ 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996), the plaintiffislipped on a scoop 
of ice cream that another customer had dropped. The plaintiff claimed the store was negligent for not 
talcing adequate precautionary measures to prevent or warn of such hazards. The court ruled that there 
was "no evidence or any basis from which a fair inference could be drawn that Storehouse Markets 
should have realized that there was ice cream on the floor or that it had the opportunity to remove it." 
Id. at 478. Plaintiff relied on Canfield v. Albertsons. Inc. 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) to argue 
that the store's method of operation created a situation where it was reasonably foreseeable! that the 
expectable acts of third parties would create a dangerous condition or defect. The court distinguished 
Canfield and ruled that the plaintiff had not produced evidence of foreseeability of an inherently 
dangerous condition. Id. at 479. See below. 
Finally, in Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 975 P.2d 467 (Utah 1999), the plaintiff slipped on a kiwi, 
and a year later slipped on a jalapeno at the same store. The court found that the case did not involve 
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"an unsafe condition of a permanent, or even semi-permanent, nature... There is no testimony that the 
floor was permanently covered with fruit or vegetable debris.*.In short, this is a case arising from an 
unsafe condition of a temporary nature." Id at 468. The plaintiff failed to provide evidence that 
Albertsons knew or should have known of the presence of the kiwi or jalapeno. 
Plaintiff cannot recover under the first theory of liability. It is undisputed that no store employee 
had actual knowledge of water on the floor. Hickory Kist cleaned the floors at night after the store 
closed. Water did not collect or pool in the area of the accident that would suggest the area was 
frequently wet. Plaintiff acknowledges that she did not see water on the floor before she slipped. "Thus 
the only way to determine how it got there, or how long it had been there, is by inference and 
conjecture." Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. 538 P.2d 175,175 (Utah 1975). 
Permanent Condition 
Plaintiff concedes that the water on the floor of Hickory Kist was not a permanent condition, but 
contends that the store's method of operation created an inherently dangerous condition that was 
foreseeable. Method of operation is analyzed under the permanent condition theory of storeowner 
liability in slip-and-fall cases. Schnuphase* 918 P.2d at 479 (citing Long v. Smith Fobd King Store. 531 
P2d at 362); Canfield v. Albertsons. Inc.. 841 P.2d 1224,1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (the second theory 
of slip-and-fall cases or permanent condition theory governs the case). 
Plaintiff argues that De Weese v. J.C. Pennev Company. 5 Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898 (Utah 
1956), and Canfield support her position. 
In De Weese. the plaintiff slipped in the entrance of defendant's store. It had'been snowing for at 
least ten minutes and for up to half an hour before plaintiff entered the store. The floor was wet and 
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muddy, and there were no rubber mats or abrasives on the floor The De Weese court noted that this was 
not a temporary condition. The entrance to the store was "terrazzo surfacing" which was "pah of the 
permanent structure of the building." 297 P 2d at 901. "The evidence clearly show[ed] that the 
defendant knew of the characteristic of terrazzo to become slippery when wet, and that it was its custom, 
and the custom of other stores with similar surfacing to use rubber mats or grit 1o prevent slipperiness 
during stormy weather." Id. In upholding the jury verdict, the court noted that there was sufficient 
evidence for a jury to conclude that it had been raining for a long enough period of tinie that defendant 
should have employed its safety measures. 
In Canfield v. Albertsons^ the Utah Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment to defendant Plaintiff slipped on a piece of lettuce. The heads of lettuce were being 
displayed in what is known as a "farmer's pack," in which the lettuce arrives from the farm without the 
damaged leaves being removed. Customers often removed and discarded the leaves from the lettuce 
they intended to purchase. Albertsons knew of this problem and placed empty boxes around the display 
for customers to discard the leaves and regularly patrolled the area. The Court of Appeals found that 
Albertsons chose a method of display where third parties would remove lettuce leaves and discard them. 
uIt was reasonably foreseeable that under this method of operation some leaves would fall or be dropped 
on the floor by customers thereby creating a dangerous condition." Id. at 1227. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Schnuphase limited the holding and precedential weigKt of Canfield. 
Schnuphase held that u[c]entral to its finding in Canfield was the court of appeals' determination that 
Albertsons had notice of the potentially hazardous condition.,," 918 P.2d at 479 (emphasis added). 
Schnuphase ruled that a plaintiff must show that the inherently dangerous condition y/as foreseeable, and 
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expressed concern with extending store owner liability in method of operation cases. See also, Babbitt 
v. 7-Eleven Sales Corporation dba 7-Eleven Food Stores Corporation. 2000 UT App. 50 (notjfor official 
publication) (plaintiff slipped on mayonnaise packet on handicap ramp outside its store). 
In the instant case there is no evidence that Hickory Kist chose a method of operation)that created 
an inherently dangerous condition, and that the inherently dangerous condition was foreseeable. Unlike 
the defendant in Canfield. Hickory Kist did not have notice that it had created a potentially hazardous 
condition. 
CONCLUSION 
It is regrettable that Ms. Jex suffered injuries. However, "not every accident that occurs gives 
rise to a cause,of action upon which the party injured may recover damages from someone. (Thousands 
of accidents occur everyday for which no one is liable in damages, and often no one is to blame." 
Schnuphase. 918 P.2d at 479-80, quoting, Martin v. Safewav Stores Inc.. 565 P.2d 1139,1142 (Utah 
1977). 
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, and the 
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is denied. The Court requests counsel for Defend&nt to 
prepare an order consistent with this decision* 
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